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Known Vulnerabilities

This page tracks known vulnerability reports that can appear in dependency scans and require NetworkNT-specific applicability analysis.

Undertow Request Smuggling CVEs

The following CVEs are all Undertow HTTP request smuggling issues in the HTTP/1.1 request parsing layer. They are relevant to light-4j because light-4j uses io.undertow:undertow-core as its embedded HTTP server. As of June 10, 2026, light-4j manages undertow-core at 2.4.1.Final, and Maven Central still lists 2.4.1.Final as the latest release.

CVEVulnerability patternNetworkNT assessment
CVE-2026-28367Non-standard header block terminator forwarded by certain proxiesConditionally applicable; mitigated by strict edge proxy validation or by not placing Undertow behind an affected HTTP/1.1 proxy path.
CVE-2026-28368Header names interpreted differently by an upstream proxy and UndertowConditionally applicable; requires a proxy/backend parser mismatch.
CVE-2026-28369First header line with leading spaces interpreted differentlyConditionally applicable; requires malformed HTTP/1.1 traffic to reach Undertow through a permissive upstream proxy.

General Applicability to light-4j

These issues should not be treated as directly exploitable in every light-4j deployment only because undertow-core appears in the dependency tree. Request smuggling requires at least two HTTP processors that disagree on where a request starts, ends, or which headers are present. A normal light-4j service that terminates client traffic itself does not have a front-end/back-end parser disagreement in the same request path.

The risk becomes relevant when a light-4j service is deployed as an Undertow origin behind an upstream HTTP/1.1 proxy, load balancer, gateway, or WAF that accepts malformed requests and forwards them to Undertow in a form Undertow interprets differently. The same inbound condition applies when a light-4j router or proxy service is placed behind another upstream proxy. The light-4j proxy modules operate on Undertow’s parsed HeaderMap and create a new outbound Undertow client request; they do not intentionally forward the original raw HTTP header block.

Standard Mitigations

Use the following controls for customer environments where scanner findings identify these CVEs:

  • Prefer the default light-4j posture: enableHttps: true, enableHttp: false, enableHttp2: true, and allowUnescapedCharactersInUrl: false.
  • Do not expose a light-4j HTTP/1.1 listener directly to untrusted networks unless there is a strict edge control in front of it.
  • Configure upstream proxies, load balancers, gateways, and WAFs to reject malformed HTTP/1.1 requests instead of forwarding or normalizing ambiguous header syntax.
  • Avoid older proxy products or legacy load balancer modes known to forward malformed HTTP/1.1 traffic to Undertow. For CVE-2026-28367, Red Hat specifically calls out older Apache Traffic Server and Google Cloud Classic Application Load Balancer configurations as examples.
  • Prefer TLS and HTTP/2 between the client-facing edge and light-4j where possible. If the edge terminates HTTP/2 and forwards HTTP/1.1 to light-4j, the edge-to-origin HTTP/1.1 hop must still enforce strict request validation.
  • Keep light-4j and deployment images current. At the time of this review, Maven Central did not provide a newer undertow-core release than 2.4.1.Final, so deployment controls are still required.

Red Hat Status Context

Red Hat rates all three CVEs as Important with CNA CVSS 3.1 score 8.7 and high attack complexity. NVD lists a separate 9.1 Critical score, but the Red Hat CNA scoring is more specific to the proxy-dependent request smuggling condition.

Red Hat’s product status is not uniform across all products. Red Hat Security Data marks some undertow-core product streams, including Red Hat Data Grid 8, Red Hat Fuse 7, and Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 7, as Will not fix, while other product streams are marked Affected or Not affected. That status supports treating these as deployment-specific findings rather than assuming every scanner match requires an immediate library replacement.

References