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Authorization A3 Migration and Removal Progress

Historical progress snapshot. This record predates Workflow Invoke and the retirement of the A1 credential broker. Its grant-backed enrollment and renewal gates are superseded; see Workflow Invoke for the current invocation and LONG credential flow.

Historical status: A3 had started; removal was not yet safe. The selected local A2 stack used separate workflow-only Agent identities, and grant-backed action invocations no longer persisted the caller’s reusable access token in ordinary Workflow invocation state. The complete A2 integration matrix and A3 consumer drain remained open at that checkpoint.

First migration slice

  • Workflow action admission still authenticates the current user and immediate caller, binds the run to the approved renewable grant, and records the action authority and dispatch ledger.
  • For the dedicated grant-backed action listener, user_authorization and user_authorization_exp are inserted as null. The broker remains the source of fresh credentials for bound MCP actions and workflow Agent jobs.
  • A later authenticated status read cannot repopulate a deliberately null token. Ordinary interactive invocations retain the existing token behavior until a qualified non-durable credential handoff replaces it.
  • Terminal cleanup remains idempotent. Existing active rows have not been rewritten: rows with valid grant authority must be migrated, while legacy rows without it must drain or be reauthorized.

Selected-stack credential inventory

WorkloadApp credentialPeer identityCurrent purpose
Gatewayissuer-signed app tokenGateway client certificateWorkflow action control and backend dispatch
Workflowissuer-signed app tokenWorkflow server/client certificatesAction API and Gateway calls
Codex workflow Agentissuer-signed app token with execution.invokeCodex client/server certificatesWorkflow jobs and Controller execution API
Claude workflow Agentissuer-signed app token with execution.invokeClaude client/server certificatesWorkflow jobs and Controller execution API

The local preparation tool generates separate app tokens and mTLS material for these identities. Gateway and Workflow keep portal.r portal.w; only the two Agent identities receive execution.invoke. Private PKI remains runtime-owned and is not checked into Git.

Legacy authority still present

The agent-delegation crate still has five direct package consumers: light-agent, light-workflow, light-gateway, light-knowledge, and light-pingora. Workflow still has signer configuration; Gateway and Knowledge still verify legacy delegation; Pingora still derives nested workflow context from it. The Agent now requires its legacy signer only when a direct Knowledge endpoint is configured, which removes the dependency from workflow-only Agents without weakening configured Knowledge access.

agent_delegation_replay_t also remains in the Agent operational schema and its validation/reset tooling. It cannot be dropped until old attempts are drained and the workflow_action_dispatch_t evidence/recovery path passes the selected stack’s first-write, partial-write, uncertainty, restart and receiver-receipt tests.

Superseded gate plan before removal

The following list records the former A3 plan and is not a current rollout procedure.

  1. Run the complete A2 authenticated action matrix, including workflow Agent and Knowledge paths, cancellation, unauthorized callers, nested depth, private targets and effect recovery.
  2. Qualify enrollment, scheduled renewal, rotation, revocation, permission changes and crash recovery against the selected issuer profile.
  3. Migrate active grant-backed invocation rows to null token storage. Drain or explicitly reauthorize active legacy rows that have no valid grant authority.
  4. Replace each remaining Gateway/Pingora/Knowledge delegation decision with the live action and receiver contracts, then prove no legacy consumer remains.
  5. Remove signer/verifier configuration and deployment secrets in one coordinated rollout. Only then remove agent-delegation and apply a migration that drops agent_delegation_replay_t while retaining the action ledger and unresolved dispatch evidence.